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Abstract 
The international governance landscape on climate change mitigation is increasingly complex across 
multiple governance levels. Climate change mitigation initiatives by non-state stakeholders can play 
an important role in governing global climate change and contribute to avoiding unmanageable climate 
change. It has been argued that the UNFCCC could and should play a stronger role in ‘orchestrating’ 
the efforts of these initiatives within the wider climate regime complex and thus inspire new and en-
hanced climate action. In fact, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda supporting cooperative climate action 
among state and non-state actors was supposed to be a major outcome of COP21.  
There is little doubt that successful mitigation initiatives can create a momentum for climate protection. 
What is missing, is a systematic analysis of how this momentum can feed back into the UNFCCC ne-
gotiation process, inspiring also enhanced and more ambitious climate mitigation by states in future 
iterations of the cycle of nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. This paper 
aims to close this gap: building on a structurational regime model, the article [1] develops a theory of 
change of how and through which structuration channels non-state initiatives can contribute to chang-
ing the politics of international climate policy; [2] traces existing UNFCCC processes and the Paris 
Agreement with a view to identifying entry points for a more direct feedback from non-state initiatives; 
and [3] derives recommendations on how and under which agenda items positive experiences can 
resonate within the UNFCCC negotiation process.  
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1 Introduction 
After the “diplomatic disaster” (Grubb 2010, 
127) of the Copenhagen climate conference, the 
world has seen a shift towards an increasingly 
‘polycentric climate governance regime’ 
(Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009; 
Ostrom 2010; Newell, Pattberg, and Schroeder 
2012; Pattberg et al. 2014; Widerberg and 
Pattberg 2015; Jordan et al. 2015). A great diver-
sity of transnational climate initiatives emerged 
that aim to govern climate change outside of the 
multilateral system. The approaches and tools of 
these initiatives vary greatly and so does their 
scope as well as the type of organisations in-
volved – private corporations, subnational au-
thorities, and/or civil society organisations.  
This trend was attributed in part to the absence 
of strong multilateral action (e.g. Bulkeley et al. 
2014). Many transnational climate initiatives can 
be seen as attempts to compensate for this lack 
of state action. Hence, it has been proposed that 
the UNFCCC could and should play a stronger 
role in ‘orchestrating’ the emerging wider gov-
ernance complex (Chan and Pauw 2014; Chan et 
al. 2015). Orchestration in the terms of Abbott et 
al. (2015) specifies a soft and indirect mode of 
governance as opposed to more hierarchical 
hard and direct modes. It builds on coexistence 
and complementarity of rather then competing 
forms of governance.  
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The adoption of the Paris Agreement restored 
some of the confidence that had been lost after 
Copenhagen (Obergassel et al. 2016). The Paris 
Agreement, while acknowledging the existence 
and value of the wider international climate gov-
ernance complex, may redefine the configuration 
and interdependencies within it. In the absence 
of a long-term multilateral international legal 
framework orchestration was suggested as a 
means to “bypass the state” (Abbott et al. 2015, 
6), to substitute or complement inadequate state 
action through targeting private and subnational 
entities. After Paris now, the challenge will be to 
integrate the wider governance complex, to take 
advantage of new approaches and experiences 
made in transnational climate initiatives in order 
to get states to take on more ambitious commit-
ments.  
The advent of the Paris Agreement clearly does 
not render transnational climate initiatives obso-
lete. Quite contrary, ambitious climate action 
beyond the level of nation states is more re-
quired than ever. The Paris Agreement imposes 
legal obligations on signatories to formulate and 
communicate climate policy objectives, the so-
called Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs). However, it does not obligate them to 
achieve those contributions.  
The Paris Agreement aims to compensate this 
lack of legal compulsion by creating a reputa-
tional risk through the establishment of manda-
tory transparency framework and review provi-
sions. These ‘global stocktakes’ will create mo-
ments of concentrated political attention every 
five years that may be used to foster the dynamic 
of the process (Hermwille 2016a).  
It has been argued that environmental multilat-
eralism cannot achieve results that substantially 
transcends what has been prepared on the na-
tional level. “Diplomacy does not happen in a 
vacuum. The positions countries take interna-
tionally are determined by their domestic politi-
cal situations.” (Obergassel et al. 2016, 40). The 
Paris Agreement now deploys a pacemaker that 
stimulates and synchronizes the “heartbeat” of 
climate policy making on the national and inter-
national levels. It creates periodic political mo-
ments, each of which can move us closer to a 
sustainable, carbon-free future. Actors from all 
political levels are needed to create to breathe 
life into these political moments. Transnational 
climate initiatives and non-state actors can and 
should play a central role in creating and manag-
ing the required momentum. The question this 
article addresses is how this outside dynamic can 
be fed back inside the negotiations. 
Building on a structurational regime model (sec-
tion 2), this article sets out to theorize more ex-
plicitly how transnational climate initiatives can 
resonate within the UNFCCC negotiations (sec-
tions 3 and 4). Following a process tracing ap-
proach, it discusses the role of non-state actors 
and transnational climate initiatives had had 
before the Paris conference (section 5) and anal-
yses the Paris Agreement and the accompanying 
COP decisions in this regard (section 6). Section 
7 discusses the results and derives the following 
recommendations: the Technical Examination 
Processes (TEPs) that have become a forum for 
non-state actors and transnational climate initia-
tives within the negotiation process should be 
established permanently alongside the Paris 
Agreement; in order to create a more immediate 
feedback loop between transnational climate 
initiatives and the multilateral process, the TEPs 
should be linked to elements of the Paris Agree-
ment, namely the global stocktake, the review of 
NDCs under the transparency framework, and 
the compliance mechanism. Section 8 concludes. 
2 A Structurational  
Regime Model 
In order to describe the impact of transnational 
climate initiatives on the multilateral process, a 
theory of decision making is required that allows 
both to conceptualize agency with non-state 
actors as well as nation states; notably, most 
literature studying regime complexes still relies 
on state-centric ontologies (c.f. Jordan et al. 
2015). Moreover, for the purpose of this paper a 
temporal perspective is required. The Paris 
Agreement is an open-ended legal framework. 
The question addressed in this paper is whether 
and how feedback from transnational climate 
initiatives can support increased ambition in 
subsequent NDC cycles. Last but not least, the 
model needs to balance structure and agency in a 
nuanced way. A deterministic structure-based 
ontology would exclude the possibility of suc-
cessful bottom-up governance initiatives while a 
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strictly agency-focussed approach would most 
likely underrate the role of international law and 
environmental multilateralism in legitimizing 
and structuring climate action. 
Structuration theory provides an ontological 
foundation that can accommodate all those re-
quirements. Structuration theory has been de-
veloped precisely to bridge the structure-agency 
divide. It argues for a duality of agency and 
structure, “agents and structures are not kept 
apart but [...] are mutually constitutive of each 
other” (Stones 2005, 21). Individual behaviour is 
co-determined by the structures in which all 
agents operate and in turn actions change or 
reproduce structures. Giddens specifies three 
modes of structuration (Giddens 1984): domina-
tion as authoritative or allocative power/control 
over resources and legitimation (norms) and 
signification (collective meaning) as the rules or, 
as Sewell (2005) calls it, cognitive ‘schemas’. In 
acting, agents reproduce and thereby reinforce 
these structures of domination, legitimation and 
signification and hence close the cycle of struc-
turation.  
Structuration theory provides a nuanced concep-
tualization of structure and agency and the itera-
tive, morphogenetic structuration cycle is inher-
ently temporal (Sewell 2005). But can a regime 
theory based on structuration theory also ac-
commodate the role of various relevant actors in 
international climate policy beyond the nation 
state?  
Arts (2000) develops a structurational regime 
model precisely for this purpose. Building on his 
model Hermwille et al. (2015) analyse the recent 
development of the UNFCCC negotiation pro-
cess. This structurational regime model will pro-
vide the basis for the subsequent analysis. 
In a nutshell, the structurational regime model 
argues that politics (in this case international 
climate policy) is a means to change (unsustain-
able) structures deliberately and through a for-
malized process. As Hermwille et al. (2015) ar-
gue, the UNFCCC and the associated policy pro-
cesses fail to provide structure by the mode of 
domination (mainly due to the anarchic charac-
ter of the concert of sovereign states), but do 
provide signification and legitimation.  
The structurational regime model applied by 
Hermwille et al. allows for a multiplicity of loci 
of agency. They argue that the UNFCCC does not 
only provide signification and legitimation to 
those nation states that are parties to the Con-
vention but also directly to actors on all govern-
ance levels including to transnational climate 
initiatives.  
It is important to note, though, that the significa-
tion and legitimation provided by the UNFCCC 
are not unique. They intersect with a multiplicity 
of other structures, sometimes in a competing 
and sometimes in a complementary way (c.f. 
Sewell 2005). Also, the policy process is itself 
subject to structure and follows certain formal 
and informal rules. “The key actors in the nego-
tiations, government officials, diplomats and 
ministers, but also participants from civil socie-
ty, business organizations, international organi-
zations, and academia, all draw on rules and 
resources embedded in their respective struc-
tures“ (Hermwille et al. 2015, 4). 
3 Structuration Channels 
from and within UNFCCC 
Heaving introduced the ontological foundations 
of the analysis, we can now turn to the specific 
case and derive a simple structuration model of 
international climate policy which includes 
transnational climate initiatives as a locus of 
agency. The various channels of structuration 
and interdependencies are illustrated in figure 1 
below. 
Decisions at the UNFCCC are ultimately taken by 
negotiators. Negotiators are typically authorized 
by a negotiation mandate provided by their re-
spective national government. Negotiation man-
dates vary in how widely or narrowly defined 
they are, but even in relatively narrowly defined 
mandates, i.e. mandates that feature numerous 
explicitly defined ‘red lines’, negotiators typically 
have some freedom to bargain and approve of 
compromises if necessary. Within their remain-
ing room to manoeuvre, it is reasonable to as-
sume that negotiators will take into account both 
dynamics and the rules of the game of the acute 
negotiations under the UNFCCC as well as struc-
tures emanating from their respective national 
discourses. 
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Alongside negotiators, national governments 
therefore remain a decisive factor and locus of 
agency in the proposed model. Under the Paris 
Agreement, Parties are obliged to “prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive nationally 
determined contributions [...and to] pursue do-
mestic mitigation measures, with the aim of 
achieving the objectives of such contributions” 
(UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 4.2). As the name indi-
cates, these so-called nationally determined con-
tributions (NDCs) are determined in sovereign 
capitals and not under international law and the 
immediate negotiation pressure of a UNFCCC 
conference of the parties. The article therefore 
conceptualizes them as a separate channel of 
structuration. 
Both negotiators and the national government 
are influenced to some extent by their respective 
national discourse. The national discourse and 
dominant narratives therein delimit the scope of 
the ‘politically feasible’. Ultimately, politicians 
need to provide meaningful explanations for 
their decisions and these explanations need to 
resonate in the political discourse of their coun-
tries. If not, legitimation will erode and at least 
in a democratic system, political power will 
hardly endure without legitimation (c.f. 
Hermwille 2016b).  
National discourses are ultimately also not inde-
pendent from structuration. As Hermwille et al. 
(2015) have shown, the UNFCCC and the associ-
ated processes deliver norms and collective 
meaning that provide a certain discursive struc-
ture also for wider political discourses. A key 
example here would be the 2 °C limit which has 
been strongly engrained by the UNFCCC as a 
widely shared norm (c.f. Hermwille et al. 2015).  
4 Integrating Transnational 
Climate Initiatives 
While it has been demonstrated that transna-
tional climate initiatives can contribute to solve 
or at least remedy climate change. Not only by 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions but also as 
originators or contributors of transformational 
change. The scope and diversity of transnational 
climate initiatives is tremendous (e.g. Bulkeley et 
al. 2014; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015; Jordan 
et al. 2015), but at least some initiatives may 
























Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the channels and interdependencies of the structuration cycle in the context of 
the UNFCCC. Own illustration. 
Hermwille   Making Initiatives Resonate  
5 
that allow to experiment with and further devel-
op new and sustainable ideas, artefacts and prac-
tices (Smith 2007; Smith and Raven 2012). 
Growing evidence from the field of transition 
research suggests that innovations developed in 
niches are the essential “seeds of transition” 
(Geels and Schot 2010, 24), but without an ap-
propriate socio-political environment they can-
not sprout (Geels and Schot 2010). 
The decisions accompanying the Paris Agree-
ment explicitly welcome the efforts of non-Party 
stakeholders (UNFCCC 2016b, paras 117, 133). 
Parties decided even to launch a work pro-
gramme on capacity building with the aim of 
“[f]ostering global, regional, national and subna-
tional cooperation” (UNFCCC 2016b, para. 73d). 
This is evidence enough to conclude that the 
UNFCCC clearly recognizes the many comple-
mentary governance initiatives and hence to 
some extent the de facto emergence of an in-
creasingly polycentric climate governance sys-
tem (see also further analysis below). It is also 
quite clear that normative goals set out by UN-
FCCC such as the 2 °C limit, the call for achiev-
ing a balance between anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions and removals by sinks in the se-
cond half of the century (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 
4), and the goal to make “finance flows con-
sistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate-resilient develop-
ment” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art 2.1c) legitimize the 
efforts of non-Party actors (c.f. Hermwille et al. 
2015).  
But how do successful transnational climate 
initiatives feed back into the multilateral pro-
cess? The UNFCCC orchestrates, i.e. it “enlists 
and supports intermediary actors [...] in pursuit 
of [its] governance goals” (Abbott et al. 2015, 4, 
italics in the original), but the resulting actions 
echo primarily on the national level and there-
fore reproduce and reinforce structures only 
indirectly with regard to the UNFCCC (see figure 
2). 
At the national level, successful climate initia-
tives can create and reinforce epistemic commu-
nities (Haas 1992) or powerful instrumental 
constituencies (Voß and Simons 2014) that may 
help to shift the political economy in a desired 
direction. Depending on their scope, they can 
demonstrate the feasibility and economic viabil-
ity of mitigation activities. This in turn can help 











































Figure 2: Structuration channels and interdependencies of transnational climate initiatives and the UNFCCC. 
Own illustration. 
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cal discourse and thus allow to reshape the room 
of the politically feasible (Hermwille 2016b). 
Last but not least, they can ease some of the dis-
tributive burden implied in some mitigation 
instruments such as, for example, emissions 
trading. If transnational climate initiatives are 
successful in abating greenhouse gas emission, 
this can reduce the required mitigation effort in 
other parts of the economy, making more ambi-
tious overall mitigation goals more attainable. 
5 Transnational Climate  
Initiatives within the  
UNFCCC 
The recognition of trans- and subnational cli-
mate initiatives has hardly been institutionalized 
under the UNFCCC. Given the intergovernmen-
tal nature of the UNFCCC the status of non-state 
actors is originally limited to an observer role. In 
the past, there had not been many avenues for 
successful transnational climate initiatives to 
communicate their achievements into the UN-
FCCC process, apart from presentations at side 
events. One way of formal recognition would 
have been via the national communications of 
nation states. The template for national commu-
nications foresees a chapter on sub-national 
activities, but arguably, it would be rather diffi-
cult to adequately present border-crossing 
transnational initiatives as sub-national activi-
ties. What is more, national communications are 
typically filed and stored after the review process 
but have little resonance within the actual nego-
tiations. 
However, in recent years, there was growing 
attention and appreciation of transnational cli-
mate initiatives in one particular negotiation 
stream under the UNFCCC. At COP17 in Durban 
(2011) developing countries had agreed to nego-
tiate a new comprehensive climate agreement 
under the Convention for the time after 2020, 
what has now become reality in the Paris 
Agreement (UNFCCC 2012). The Durban man-
date was the result of a balanced compromise. 
Developing countries had originally objected to 
the term ‘comprehensive’ meaning that mitiga-
tion obligations would not apply only to indus-
trialised countries but would entail contributions 
by all countries, varying only in their content but 
not in their legal form. Developing countries 
only agreed to this formulation on the condition 
that industrialised countries agreed to negotia-
tions on how to increase the ambition of their 
own mitigation commitments for the time before 
2020 (Sterk et al. 2011). 
The Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Plat-
form (ADP) that carried out the negotiations 
was, hence, organized along two streams of 
work: Workstream 1 was tasked to negotiate 
what became the Paris Agreement and 
Workstream 2 started out as a process mainly to 
negotiate new and increased mitigation com-
mitments for industrialized (Annex 1) countries.  
Developing countries pressed their industrial-
ized counterparts to rapidly ratify the Doha 
Amendments of the Kyoto Protocol (second 
commitment period) and to increase their miti-
gation goals, however, with limited success: not 
one developed country has increased its mitiga-
tion commitment as compared to what had been 
communicated in the Cancún Agreements back 
in 2010. Workstream 2 still should not be con-
sidered a failure. As a response to the lack of 
progress with respect to the increased national 
mitigation pledges it changed significantly and 
added some novel aspects to the UNFCCC nego-
tiations. Workstream 2 created a room to explore 
the contributions of international and transna-
tional climate initiatives in closing the ‘mitiga-
tion gap’ between the pledges of industrialized 
countries and the atmospheric needs to limit 
global warming to 1.5/2 °C above pre-industrial 
levels (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015; Ott et al. 
2014). 
Under Workstream 2 a series of technical expert 
meetings (TEMs) were convened, starting off 
with an in-session workshop on urbanisation 
and the role of sub-national governments in 
facilitating climate action in cities at COP19 held 
in Warsaw 2013 (Sterk et al. 2013). Building on 
this positive experience, parties agreed to con-
tinue this format also during the intersessional 
meetings in 2014 and at COP20 in Lima. 
While the first TEMs were rather generic in na-
ture, in Lima, Parties decided to advance from 
the exchange of information to a more action-
oriented approach. Parties agreed to build on the 
results of earlier TEMs, to go into more detail 
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and to ‘focus on actionable policy options’ (UN-
FCCC 2015, para. 19). 
Also in Lima, this technical process was com-
plemented with a high-level political event to 
showcase good practices and provide a spotlight 
for policy makers to announce new initiatives 
and/or to increase the ambition of existing ones. 
Hosted by COP20 President Manuel Pulgar-
Vidal, the event included contributions from a 
wide range of stakeholders exceptional for a 
formal UNFCCC high-level event. Alongside the 
Secretary General of the United Nations also 
civil society representatives, sub-national gov-
ernments and business representatives had the 
opportunity to speak (Ott et al. 2014). 
Under the joint auspices of Manuel Pulgar-Vidal 
and French Minister of the Environment, 
Ségolène Royal, this high-level process was con-
tinued under the banner of the Lima-Paris Ac-
tion Agenda (LPAA). Under this “fourth pillar of 
the Paris Agreement” (Ségolène Royal cited in 
Republique Française 2015) meetings were held 
nearly every day including on issues such as 
forests and agriculture, resilience, transport, 
buildings, private finance, short-lived climate 
pollutants, renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
cities and subnational actors, innovation, and 
businesses.  
And the idea of putting climate initiatives on the 
spotlight worked well. Several high-profile initia-
tives were announced at the LPAA. Most note-
worthy probably is the Africa Renewable Energy 
Initiative (AREI) of 54 African States that aims 
to install 300 GW of new renewable energy gen-
eration capacity by 2030. France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, Canada, 
and the European Commission have pledged to 
contribute USD 10 billion by 2020 to support the 
initiative. Another prominent example is “Mis-
sion Innovation”, an initiative by 20 major econ-
omy countries to expedite research and devel-
opment on low-carbon technologies, which is 
coupled with the private Breakthrough Energy 
Coalition of 28 billionaire investors initiated by 
Bill Gates. Gates himself had announced to in-
vest USD 2 billion in research and development 
of low-carbon technologies. Finally, around 700 
major cities, regions, companies and investors 
from all continents signed the Paris Pledge for 
Action (L’Appel de Paris), promising to do their 
part in implementing the Paris Agreement and 
accelerating the required transformative change 
(UNFCCC Newsroom 2015; see also Obergassel 
et al. 2016). To conclude, the LPAA did provide 
an attractive setting in the public spotlight for 
non-party actors to communicate their contribu-
tion.  
6 Transnational Climate  
Initiatives in the Paris 
Agreement 
The mandate of the ADP which had housed the 
TEMs in the last two years terminated with the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement. The question 
in Paris, therefore, was, whether this process 
would continue, with what kind of mandate and 
where it should be housed under the UNFCCC 
architecture. In Paris Parties agreed to continue 
the series of TEMs, now dubbed “technical ex-
amination process” (TEP), under the joint auspi-
ces of SBI and SBSTA and to strengthen it by 
inter alia requesting the Technology Executive 
Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network (CTCN) to engage in the 
process and enhance their facilitative efforts. 
Also parties encouraged the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) as operating entity of the Financial Mech-
anism to engage in the process and to provide 
information with respect to its contribution to 
the implementation of policies and measures 
identified in the TEP. 
Paris provided also an extensive and very strong 
mandate for the Secretariat to organize the pro-
cess and disseminate its results (UNFCCC 
2016b, paras 109–13). The Secretariat shall: 
• organize focussed technical expert meetings 
representing best practices that are replica-
ble and scalable; 
• maintain a technical paper on mitigation 
benefits and wider sustainable development 
co-benefits of the presented mitigation ac-
tivities, as well as options to support their 
implementation; 
• and prepare on an annual basis a summary 
for policy makers with information on spe-
cific policies and practices and options for 
support for implementation. The summary 
for policy makers is to be published two 
month ahead of each COP. 
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Also, parties have agreed to convene high-level 
events building on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda 
in conjunction with each COP between 2016–
2020. This is supposed to strengthen high-level 
engagement in implementation of policy options, 
provide an opportunity to announcing new initi-
atives and coalitions, and taking stock of pro-
gress of non-party initiatives and processes. 
Moreover, parties agreed to appoint two high-
level champions that shall facilitate high-level 
engagement in the process and provide guidance 
to the Secretariat on behalf of the COP Presiden-
cies (UNFCCC 2016b, paras 120–23). The high-
level champions serve overlapping two-year 
terms. Each year, one champion is to be ap-
pointed by the COP Presidency. France has nom-
inated Laurence Tubiana, who had played a crit-
ical role in facilitating the Paris Agreement as 
lead of the French COP Presidency.  
Owing to its origins in Workstream 2 of the ADP, 
the TEMs had almost exclusively focussed on 
mitigation. In Paris, though, developing coun-
tries demanded that a similar process should be 
established also for adaptation. Consequently, a 
complementary adaptation TEP was established, 
which, likewise, will be held under the joint aus-
pices of SBI and SBSTA. It will focus on facilitat-
ing the sharing of good practice and lessons 
learned, identifying actions for enhanced im-
plementation, promoting cooperative action on 
adaptation, as well as identifying opportunities 
to strengthen enabling environments. The Adap-
tation Committee has been mandated to explore 
ways to synergize with existing adaptation relat-
ed work programmes (UNFCCC 2016b, paras 
124–32).  
7 Discussion 
The analysis  presented above clearly demon-
strates that the recognition of transnational cli-
mate initiatives by the UNFCCC is not only a lip 
service, but various technical and political fora 
exist in which achievements of transnational 
climate initiatives have been highlighted. Still, 
from the observations of the LPAA in Paris, one 
gets the impression that this recognition is ra-
ther a means to amplify and publicise the initia-
tives to the media and the outside world than as 
an input for the negotiation process. In fact, the 
LPAA was still rather detached from the core 
negotiations in Paris, not only in terms of con-
tent but also physically: the LPAA meetings were 
held at the official side event space in a building 
separate from the negotiation rooms. Busy nego-
tiators rarely made it into this building. Instead, 
the floors were filled with observers of all con-
stituencies including the press. This logistical 
incident clearly hints to who the target audience 
of the LPAA really was.  
Nevertheless, the Paris decisions should be rec-
ognized as a significant step forward. Most im-
portantly is the decision to continue the TEPs 
and to house them under the joint auspices of 
SBI and SBSTA. This promises to contribute to a 
further integration of non-party actors and initi-
atives with the UNFCCC formal negotiations.  
The much more focused mandate for the TEPs 
will likely improve on the already successful 
format. The mandate to produce and maintain 
technical reports that synthesise the work of the 
TEP and summaries for policy makers will al-
most certainly contribute to making good prac-
tices and lessons learned as well as opportunities 
to implement successful policies and practices 
much more digestible for those interested in 
implementing similar measures. Ideally, the 
summary for policy makers would take the form 
of a ‘policy menu’ that integrates good practices, 
lessons learned and support opportunities 
(Höhne et al. 2014). 
Also the explicit inclusion of UNFCCC bodies – 
GCF, TEC and CTCN – in the TEPs goes a long 
way to incorporate the technical infrastructure of 
the UNFCCC in the process. Still, the mandate is 
formulated in a way that suggests that UNFCCC 
bodies rather provide input than to receive it. 
The continuation of the LPAA in the form of 
annual high-level meetings and the inclusion of 
high-level champions are also laudable devel-
opments, as they provide an opportunity to 
communicate at an appropriate level new initia-
tives and / or increased level of ambition of ex-
isting coalitions.  
Originating from a negotiation stream exclusive-
ly focused to help increase the near-term level of 
mitigation ambition, the TEPs and the LPAA 
have become much more than that. This alone 
should provide sufficient reason to expand the 
mandate of the TEPs and the annual high-level 
events. Again, due to its origin in ADP 
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Workstream 2, the mandate only covers the pe-
riod from 2016 till 2020. Given the increasing 
importance of non-party actors and the ever 
growing number of transnational climate initia-
tives, the COP should decide to establish the 
TEPs permanently alongside the Paris Agree-
ment. 
But despite all this progress, there still does not 
exist a direct channel to shortcut the structu-
ration cycle sketched in sections 3 and 4: suc-
cessful transnational climate initiatives still can-
not feed back immediately, neither into the acute 
negotiations nor directly in the NDC process.  
One way to improve on this would be to link the 
TEPs with provisions to be developed with re-
spect to the matter of the global stocktake , the 
transparency framework, and possibly the facili-
tative compliance mechanism of the Paris 
Agreement Article 13 (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 13-
15). The Paris Agreement has established a 5-
yearly cycle  (starting in 2023) “to take stock of 
the implementation of this Agreement to assess 
the collective progress [...]. It shall do so in a 
comprehensive and facilitative manner” 
(UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 15). As current NDCs are 
widely out of line with the Paris Agreements 
long-term goal (UNFCCC 2016c), the first global 
stocktake will almost certainly identify a signifi-
cant gap. Transnational climate initiatives not 
only can contribute to close this gap, insights 
and experiences from transnational climate ini-
tiatives, condensed and refined through the 
TEPs, may help to identify viable solutions that 
can then be taken up by nation states in their 
subsequent NDCs. 
Linking the TEPs with the transparency frame-
work of the Paris Agreement would create an 
even closer structuration channel. In Paris, Par-
ties decided to launch a work programme on the 
transparency framework (UNFCCC 2016b, paras 
91–98). The purpose of the transparency frame-
work is inter alia to track progress towards 
achieving individual NDCs (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 
13.5). The framework specifies information re-
quirements and mandates a technical expert 
review. Explicitly, the “review shall also identify 
areas of improvement for the Party” (UNFCCC 
2016a, Art. 13.12). This task could also be facili-
tated by and through the TEPs. Reviewers 
should make specific recommendations for each 
country drawing on the ‘policy menu’, the portfo-
lio of good practices developed and maintained 
in the TEPs.  
One step further even would be to link the TEPs 
to the compliance mechanism of the Paris 
Agreement. Article 15.2 establishes a compliance 
committee that is “facilitative in nature and 
function in a manner that is transparent, non-
adversarial and non-punitive” (UNFCCC 2016a, 
Art. 15.2). Formulating recommendations or 
requirements based on experiences based on the 
results of the TEPs could strike a balance be-
tween the non-punitive and non-adversarial 
nature of the compliance committee yet main-
tain some form of compulsion. Arguably, this 
would on national sovereignty and may therefore 
difficult to agree on internationally, but formu-
lating the recommendations in the form of a 
directive that leaves some leeway for the con-
cerned Party with respect to the details of the 
implementation may reconcile these concerns. 
8 Conclusions 
The above analysis shows that, clearly, the UN-
FCCC has started to recognize transnational 
climate initiatives and the work of non-party 
actors in recent years. But to date, the institu-
tional design still largely resembles a structu-
rational one-way street: the UNFCCC provides 
legitimation to transnational climate initiatives, 
but there is no way for such initiatives to imme-
diately feed back some of the positive dynamics 
they have created. Linking the (permanent) 
TEPs with elements of the Paris Agreement – the 
global stocktake, the transparency framework 
and the compliance mechanism – could estab-
lish structuration channels that short-cut the 
indirect feedback that transnational climate ini-
tiatives can have through the national discourses 
of the countries they operate in.  
Now is the time to foster the integration of 
transnational climate initiatives and non-party 
actors in the multilateral framework. Negotia-
tions regarding the detailed provisions on those 
three elements have just started. This leaves 
ample opportunity to create spaces that help 
transnational climate initiatives resonate within 
the Paris Agreement’s architecture and thereby 
contribute more directly to increased ambition 
in subsequent NDCs. 
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